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Executive Summary and Key Findings 
Issue addressed by the research 
 Schools differ widely in the social composition of their intakes meaning that 
children from more affluent families tend to be educated separately from those 
less affluent. 
 The children of poorer parents tend to go to schools that perform less well. 
 This suggests that poorer parents may have unequal access to good schools 
partly because of covert and explicit selection by schools. 
 For these reasons admissions have been increasingly subject to regulation by 
successive Codes. 
Aim of the research 
 To investigate whether changes to the School Admissions Code in 2003 and 
2007 concerning school admission arrangements have had any discernible 
effect on the social composition of English secondary schools. 
Method 
 The research links data from three surveys of secondary school admissions to 
all available years of the National Pupil Database (NPD). 
 These surveys give us a snap-shot of arrangements in use prior to the 2003 
Admissions Code, immediately following the implementation of the 2003 Code 
and following the implementation of the 2007 Code. 
 We calculated changes in the free school meals eligibility (FSM), the school’s 
prior attainment profile and the proportion of white British ethnicity pupils at 
the school for the years 2001/2 to 2009/10. 
 Our analysis investigates the relationship between schools that used 
inadmissible admissions criteria and changes in school composition over the 
period of our analysis. 
Key Findings 
 The 2003 and 2007 School Admissions Codes appear to have been at least in 
part responsible for changes in social composition of pupils at schools with 
criteria and arrangements that were subsequently deemed inadmissible. 
 These relationships still held once we had controlled for changes in 
neighbourhood composition. 
 Contrary to expectations, school type was not strongly associated with 
change in composition. 
 However, a significant number of the schools experiencing very large changes 
in composition were foundation or voluntary-aided and responsible for their 
own admissions. 
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Introduction 
This research investigates whether changes to the School Admissions Code in 2003 
and 2007 concerning school admission arrangements appear to have had direct 
effects on the published admissions policies and the social composition of particular 
schools.  The effect of these changes in the Code have been indirectly captured by 
three surveys of school admissions brochures carried out by teams at the LSE (for 
2001 and 2008 entry) and Sheffield Hallam University (for 2006 entry).  Whilst 
changes in admissions have been described by researchers, to date these three 
databases of admissions policies and procedures have not been analysed alongside 
each other.  Nor have they been combined with data relating to pupil characteristics.  
In this research we thus link the three survey databases of school admissions 
policies to pupil-level data contained in the National Pupil Database (NPD) in order 
to analyse changes in the social composition of year 7 intakes of pupils to secondary 
schools across England.  In short, whilst generalised changes in admissions have 
been described by researchers, this is the first piece of research that investigates the 
specific effects that the Codes appear to have had on the social composition of 
individual schools over time. 
Social segregation and admissions 
In England, as in a number of other developed countries children from more affluent 
families tend to be educated separately from those less affluent.  Jenkins et al. 
(2008) conclude that in terms of such social segregation England is a ‘middle-
ranking country’. In England the historic division between the maintained and private 
sectors with approximately seven percent of parents paying for private education is 
the most obvious manifestation, but state maintained schools of all types differ 
markedly in terms of the social and economic status of their intake (Sutton Trust 
2006) and Jenkins et al. (2008) found it is the unevenness in social background in 
the state sector that mostly accounts for the social segregation of English schools.  It 
is not unreasonable to take this as evidence of unequal access to ‘good’ schools. In 
addition there is evidence that more segregated education systems perform less well 
overall (OECD 2001, 2003). 
The reasons for the social segregation of schooling are complex and deep rooted 
(Coldron et al., 2010).  Since the Education Act of 1980 and the Education Reform 
Act of 1988, successive governments have adopted parental choice and the 
development of a ‘quasi-market’ in school-based education (in England) as the 
preferred means for the general improvement of schools and enhancing the supply 
of high quality educational provision. Early studies suggested that the quasi-market 
reforms would cause the schooling system to become more segregated for three 
inter-related reasons: first, because parents from differing social backgrounds vary in 
how strongly they engage with the process of choice and how far they are able to 
negotiate the process; second, because parents from different social backgrounds 
appear to choose different schools on different criteria (including material resources 
available); and third, because schools, in response to market incentives, will look to 
select more socially advantaged pupils.   In the case of schools, it has been argued 
that some such schools are more able and willing to do this than others partly 
because of differing admission arrangements.  For example, it is possible for a 
school that interviews parents in order to determine their religious adherence also to 
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use this to favour more socially advantaged parents.  Admissions criteria may also 
be used to deliberately discourage certain parents from applying to the school if they 
feel they are unlikely to meet the criteria.  For example, the need to ‘demonstrate’ a 
commitment to the school or prove religious commitment through a marriage 
certificate could both discourage applications from some families. 
Several studies have demonstrated that schools, particularly voluntary-aided and 
foundation schools, which control their own admissions have arrangements that offer 
the potential for social selection (West and Pennell 1997; Woods et al. 1998; West et 
al., 2004; Coldron et al. 2008; West, 2006). Others have reported that local 
authorities where a larger proportion of schools are their own admission authorities 
also have above average school segregation and that both voluntary-aided and 
foundation schools are associated with a larger gap between the level of residential 
segregation and school segregation (Allen, 2007; Goldstein and Noden, 2003). 
Early and more recent qualitative evidence and arguments that the introduction of 
market-like mechanisms into the process of school admissions is likely to increase 
segregation appeared strong, but subsequent quantitative studies did not find 
evidence of such an effect. Despite methodological disputes about the measurement 
of segregation, it is generally agreed that the unevenness in the distribution of free 
school meals (FSM) pupils across schools did not increase in the first decade 
following the 1988 Act (Gorard et al., 2003; Allen and Vignoles, 2007).  FSM 
segregation did appear to rise very slightly between 1999 and 2004, but the measure 
is very sensitive to changes in the economic cycle and so it would be unwise to 
attribute this rise to a change in education policy (Allen and Vignoles, 2007; 
Goldstein and Noden, 2003).  Gibbons and Telhaj (2006) overcome the problems 
with the FSM measure by using the National Pupil Database (NPD) to show there is 
very little change in ability segregation between 1996 and 2002. 
Nevertheless policy makers over the last decade have been persuaded of a 
dysfunction in the education market and of the need for regulation as opposed to 
guidance to prevent schools covertly selecting more advantaged students. As a 
result the regulatory machinery has been progressively strengthened.  It has evolved 
between 1999 and 2009 through five codes of practice governing what 
arrangements admission authorities can put in place (DfEE, 1999; DfES 2003; DCSF 
2007; DCSF 2009; DCSF, 2010). In addition the Office of the Schools Adjudicator 
has been created with powers to monitor and require compliance with the Code and 
Admission Forums are required to scrutinise all local admission arrangements. The 
key question this research seeks to answer is whether there has been any change in 
the composition of schools that might be attributed to the greater regulation of 
admissions. 
The 2006 Education and Inspections Act introduced much stronger provisions on 
admissions, including the prohibition of pre-admission interviews, and the 2007 
Admissions Code made mandatory certain provisions that had previously been 
‘guidance’.  It also introduced a duty to ‘promote’ equity.i  The work reported here 
focuses on the effects of some of these regulations governing admissions 
arrangements.  
While the provisions of the 2006 Act predominantly addressed concerns with the 
behaviour of providers it also intended to address problems assumed to be hindering 
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choice for poorer and less well educated parents. For example, it outlawed payments 
associated with admissions and restrictions on the costs of uniforms; provided more 
subsidy for poorer parents to meet the costs of travel to more distant schools; and 
required LAs to offer advice on school admissions.  It is possible that these 
measures could also have affected the social composition of schools making it more 
difficult to assess the independent effect of changes to admission criteria. We are not 
aware (as at June 2010) of any evaluation of the effects of the regulations on the 
costs of uniforms, nor on the changes to travel subsidies. We cannot therefore 
gauge how far they did or did not contribute to any observed changes to school 
intakes.  In the case of Choice Advice (the most common way in which advice was 
offered) there has been a full evaluation, which found that the proportion of poorer 
parents gaining access to high performing schools as a result of contact with a 
choice adviser was extremely small and would not have significantly affected the 
intake of any one school in an area (Stiell et al., 2008).ii  Unlike regulations on 
uniform, travel and choice advice, admission arrangements directly affect the relative 
ease of access of schools in an area and are likely therefore to have a bigger impact.  
It is important to stress that the research reported here is underpinned by the Codes 
in operation between 1999 and 2007.  The 2009 and 2010 Codes did not come into 
force until 10 February 2009 and 10 February 2010 respectively. 
Legislative and policy context 
The 1998 School Standards and Framework Act established a new legal framework 
for school admissions.  Two key mechanisms were introduced: a Code of Practice 
on School Admissions and the Office of the Schools Adjudicator.  Schools 
Adjudicators have a specific role in determining objections to admission 
arrangements. 
Parents/carers must be allowed to express a minimum of three preferences for 
publicly-funded secondary schools for their child, generally at the age of 11 years 
when they move from primary to secondary school (see DfES, 2007).  They are 
required to complete a ‘common application form’ provided by and returned to their 
local authority.  Some schools are permitted to seek additional information about 
prospective pupils, by asking parents/carers to complete supplementary information 
forms (SIFs).  If there are fewer applicants than places available at a particular 
school, all those expressing a preference must be offered a place for their child.iii  If 
there are more applicants than places available, the school’s published 
oversubscription criteria are used to determine which children are offered a place.  
Legislative framework 
Admission authorities (the local authority or the school, in the case of schools 
responsible for their own admissions) must comply with the law, but until 2007 they 
were only required to ‘have regard to’ the guidance given in the School Admissions 
Code; having done so, they were able to set admissions criteria that did not comply 
with the Code as long as they had good reasons for their actions (House of 
Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2004).   
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The first Code came into force on 1 April 1999 (DfEE, 1999) and applied to 
arrangements leading to admissions from September 2000.  This noted that 
admission authorities had ‘a fairly wide discretion to determine their own 
oversubscription criteria provided these criteria are objective, fair, compatible with 
admissions and equal opportunities legislation’ (1999, para. 5.2).  The general 
guidance was broadly similar in the second Code (DfES, 2003).  Further changes 
followed the Education and Inspections Act 2006 which prohibited interviews to 
determine whether an applicant is to be admitted to a school (see DfES, 2007, 1.46).  
Also in 2006, the Education (Admission of Looked After Children) (England) 
Regulations were introduced requiring an admission authority to give ‘first priority in 
its oversubscription criteria to all relevant looked after children’ (s 3).  The third 
School Admissions Code (DfES, 2007) which came into force in February 2007, and 
applied to admissions from September 2008, differed from the previous Codes in 
that there were certain provisions that were mandatory and certain practices that 
were not to be used (see West et al., 2011). 
Equal opportunities 
The first Code (DfEE, 1999) noted that in light of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
and the Race Relations Act 1976 ‘admission authorities should consider the possible 
impact, direct or indirect, on equal opportunities of their proposed oversubscription 
criteria’ (para 5.7).  The second Code (DfES, 2003) reiterated these points and also 
noted that criteria such as giving preference to children whose siblings had 
previously attended the school, or with parents in specific occupations (such as 
teachers) could disadvantage certain individuals who had recently moved into the 
area.  The third Code (DfES, 2007) had a mandatory requirement in relation to ‘fair 
access’ and also noted that admission authorities and governing bodies should 
adopt admission arrangements actively promoting equity.  It was noted that random 
allocation could be ‘good practice’ as it ‘can widen access to schools for those 
unable to afford to buy houses near to favoured schools and create greater social 
equity’ (DfES, 2007, para 2.28).   
Reference was also made to pupil ability banding ‘used by some admission 
authorities to ensure that their intake includes a proportionate spread of children of 
different abilities’ (DfES, 2007, para 2.79).  Banding is of different types: some is in 
relation to individual schools, some in relation to two or more schools and some 
across a local authority area (DfES, 2007; see also West, 2005; Allen and West, 
2009). 
The second Code (DfES, 2003) made explicit reference to ‘looked after’ children, a 
particularly disadvantaged group.   It recommended that admission authorities give 
looked after children ‘top priority’ in their oversubscription criteria (para. 7.22).  The 
third Code (DfES, 2007) strengthened this stating that, in line with regulations ‘All 
admission authorities must give highest priority in their oversubscription criteria to 
these children’ (para 2.7).   
All Codes have addressed the admission of children with statements of special 
educational needs; this is underpinned by the Education Act 1996 and as stated in 
the third Code (DfES, 2007), this ‘requires the governing bodies of all maintained 
schools to admit a child with a statement of special educational needs that names 
their school’ (para 1.50).  ‘This is not an oversubscription criterion; schools must 
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admit such children whether they have places or not’ (DfES, 2007, para 2.6).  The 
admission of children with statements of special educational needs is thus carried 
out differently from that of others. 
School admissions databases 
This research links data from three surveys of secondary school admissions to all 
available years of the National Pupil Database (NPD).  Rather fortuitously, the 
timings of the only three surveys of school admissions that exist give us a snap-shot 
of policies that were in use prior to the 2003 Admissions Code, immediately following 
the implementation of the 2003 Code and following the implementation of the 2006 
Code. 
LSE 2001 admissions database 
The LSE database of secondary school admissions policies for September 2001 
entry was funded by the LSE and carried out in cooperation with the Research and 
Information on State Education (RISE) Trust.  This has been described and analysed 
elsewhere (e.g. West and Hind, 2003; West et al., 2004; Allen and West, 2009). 
The research involved setting up a database of admissions criteria to individual 
state-funded secondary (or high) schools in September 2001.iv  Data were collated 
for the majority (95%) of secondary schools in England (N=3013) (15 city technology 
colleges, officially classified as ‘independent’ were excluded).  Data were obtained 
from local authority (LA) brochures and from individual admission authorities 
(voluntary-aided and foundation schools) where information was not provided in 
brochures.  The missing schools were foundation/voluntary-aided schools that were 
not included in brochures and did not provide information when asked for details 
(West et al., 2004). 
Sheffield Hallam 2006 admissions database 
The Sheffield Hallam study of secondary school admissions for the cohort entering in 
September 2006 was commissioned by the then Department for Children, Families 
and Schools (DCSF) and is reported in Coldron et al. (2008).  
A database was created of the admission arrangements for all maintained schools 
from the 2006 composite prospectus sent to parents by each LA in England. Of the 
148 local authorities that coordinated secondary applications we obtained the 2006 
composite prospectus from 135 (91%). The 2006 prospectus was not available for 
the other 13 authorities (9%) and for these the 2007 prospectus was used. The 
research team wrote to all voluntary-aided and foundation schools and Academies 
requesting copies of their supplementary information forms (SIFs) or confirmation 
that they did not ask for further information: 67% of these schools responded. 
The arrangements for a total of 3122 schools were analysed. This included all 
community, voluntary-controlled, voluntary-aided and foundation schools and 
academies (but not city technology colleges). 
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LSE 2008 admissions database 
The LSE database of secondary school admissions policies for September 2008 
entry was commissioned by RISE with financial support from the Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation.  It has been completed and published by RISE (West et al., 2009). It 
contains detailed information on the types of admissions criteria currently in use by 
schools, and information regarding admissions procedures (see also West et al., 
2011). 
Data on admissions criteria and practices for publicly-funded secondary schools for 
September 2008 were obtained from information provided by all the LAs in England 
with publicly-funded secondary schools.  Although LAs had a statutory responsibility 
to publish these, in some cases inadequate information was provided about schools 
responsible for their own admissions (voluntary-aided, foundation and academies) so 
individual schools were contacted.  A total of 3134 secondary schools were included 
in the sample, virtually all those in England.v  Academies and city technology 
colleges were included given that the former are required to adhere to certain 
aspects of legislation and guidance (see also West et al., 2009), 
Issues emerging from admissions databases 
Over the time period covered by the three surveys a number of highly significant 
changes took place.  In 2001, it was found that a significant minority of secondary 
schools, in the main those that are responsible for their own admissions, used a 
variety of criteria that appeared to be designed to select in certain groups of pupils: 
these included giving priority to the children of employees, of former pupils and with 
a family connection to the school (11%); and selecting a proportion of children on the 
basis of aptitude/ability in a subject area(s) (3%) (West et al., 2004). 
In 2006, admissions were better regulated than in 2001 (Coldron et al., 2008).  
However, some schools, in particular voluntary-aided schools, were less compliant 
than other types of school with the second School Admissions Code (DfES, 2003) 
and were more likely to select covertly than community schools.  They also found 
that there had been an increase (from less than 1% to 4%) in the proportion of 
schools selecting 10% of their intake on the basis of aptitude.  Voluntary-aided and 
foundation schools were more likely to select in this way than community or 
voluntary-controlled schools.  In relation to children in care, two thirds of schools had 
this as a high priority but nearly a quarter did not mention it as a criterion.  More than 
half of the schools included medical/social need in their oversubscription criteria: but 
foundation and voluntary-aided schools were less likely than other school types to 
mention either children in care or medical/social need.  Coldron et al. (2008) also 
investigated the use of supplementary information forms required by schools finding 
that around one in three non-community schools asked for additional information 
with voluntary-aided schools being more likely to do so than any other school type.  
In 2008, following the third School Admissions Code (DfES, 2007), virtually all 
schools were found to give priority to children in care, as required by legislation, 
although a small minority of schools responsible for their own admissions did not.  A 
minority of schools also failed to give top priority to this group of children, although 
by law they should.  In a significant minority of schools, in the main those with 
responsibility for their own admissions, some criteria used are designed to select in 
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certain groups of pupils, with an increased percentage selecting a proportion of 
pupils on the basis of aptitude/ability in a subject(s) – an increase from 3% in 2001 to 
4% in 2006 to 5% in 2008 (Coldron et al., 2008; West et al., 2004; 2011).  The 
highest proportion of schools that selected a proportion of pupils on the basis of 
ability/aptitude in a subject area (allowed by legislation and guidance) were 
academies and foundation schools.  Very few schools reported the use of interviews 
(less than 1%), prohibited by the Education and Inspections Act 2006, although there 
was some evidence of pre-admission meetings by schools that were their own 
admission authority.  Supplementary information forms (SIFs) were used by around 
15% of all non-grammar secondary schools.  Schools seeking information not 
allowed for by the Code were virtually all voluntary-aided or foundation schools as 
opposed to either academies whose admissions policies are agreed with the 
Secretary of State or schools whose admissions are the responsibility of the local 
authority (West et al., 2011). 
Schools with criteria that have become inadmissible 
The research on which we draw was carried out differently and the databases 
created and coded differently.  This means that although some criteria and practices 
are broadly similar across the three databases, some are not and this limits the 
direct comparisons we can make over time.  Because we cannot straightforwardly 
match changes in admission policies for every school, we focus our analysis on 
those that used inadmissible admissions criteria. 
We first select a set of non-grammar secondary schools from our 2001 database that 
were using policies that were shortly to become inadmissible under the 2003 School 
Admission Code.  These policies include: 
1. schools giving priority to pupils with some family connection to the school, for 
example, the relatives of employees, governors or former pupils (used by 
11%);  
2. schools holding interviews of the parents and/or the pupil to determine 
religious adherence prior to admission to the school (2% interviewed pupils 
and 1% parents); 
3. schools using the academic record of the child from primary school or the 
academic record of an older sibling to determine priority (used by less than 
1%).  
We select a second group of schools from our 2006 database that were using 
policies shortly to become inadmissible under the 2007 School Admission Code.  
These policies include: 
1. schools that give priority to those parents who list the school as their first 
preference on the common application form (used by 30%); 
2. schools that did not have child in care as the first criterion for entry (used by 
54%); 
3. schools asking for evidence of parental commitment to the school or the 
child’s education (used by 9%); 
4. schools giving priority to pupils with some family connection to the school, for 
example, the relatives of employees, governors or former pupils (used by 
4%); 
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5. schools holding interviews of the parents and/or the pupil to determine 
religious adherence or suitability for admission to school (used by less than 
1%); 
6. schools requesting inadmissible supplementary information from parents 
(used by 10%). 
It is worth noting that these criteria vary in the likely scope of their impact. For 
example in 2006 over half of all schools (54%) did not have child in care as a first 
priority but the number of children to which it will apply is less than 1%vi. The 
proportions of schools using in 2006 the other criteria now outlawed by the new code 
was small but notable – parental commitment (9%), family or other connection (4%) - 
as was the proportion requesting kinds of supplementary information now deemed 
inadmissible (10%).  The percentage of schools requiring interviews was very low 
(0.3%).  On the other hand outlawing the first preference first criterion applied to 30% 
of all schools. 
National Pupil Database 
The analysis draws on all nine available years of School Census data from the 
National Pupil Database (NPD).  Information on pupils in year 7 in January of 2001/2 
through to 2009/10 is used to analyse changes in the school’s social composition.  
The analysis covers all schools with year 7 pupils, excluding special schools and 
those with fewer than 10 pupils in their year 7 cohort.  This clearly excludes 
secondary schools with year 8 or year 9 entry since these pupils would have been in 
middle schools at the time.  3867 schools appear in at least one of the nine years in 
the analysis, but only 2884 schools appear in each of the nine years. 
The NPD provides key socio-demographic information on all children in year 7 in 
state-maintained secondary (or middle) schools over nine years.  In this study we 
analyse changes in the free school meals eligibility (FSM) proportion, recognising the 
limitations of this as a proxy for low income (Hobbs and Vignoles, 2009).  The overall 
proportion of year 7 pupils who are FSM changes each year in line with the 
economic cycle, as shown in Table 1.  We also use indicators of the school’s prior 
attainment profile.  The pupil’s total Key Stage Two (KS2) score is standardised with 
a mean average of zero and standard deviation of one for each cohort year and 
school-level indicators for the proportion of pupils who scored in the top and lowest 
quartile nationally are included.  Finally, we measure changes in the proportion of 
white British ethnicity pupils at the school and this overall proportion declines each 
year, reflecting recent migration patterns. 
The NPD provides a postcode for each pupil in year 7 and from this we are able to 
place the home address of the pupil on an Ordnance Survey grid location to within 
100 metres accuracy (see Harland and Stillwell, 2007, for analysis of the accuracy of 
this data).  There is minor imputation on the pupil characteristics where they are 
missing.  The pupil KS2 score is imputed using all other available individual subject 
KS2 test scores, plus socio-demographic characteristics.  The white British ethnicity 
indicator is imputed using the secondary school mean white British ethnicity 
proportion.  The pupil’s home location northing and easting are imputed using the 
median location of the child’s primary school cohort. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for year 7 pupils 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FSM proportion (%) 17.1 16.7 16.6 16.4 16.4 16.1 16.0 16.5 17.2 
Ethnicity white proportion (%) 85.2 84.7 84.2 83.0 81.5 80.4 79.7 78.7 77.8 
Average size of cohort 174.4 176.0 174.8 170.0 171.9 169.3 165.8 170.8 168.0 
Number of schools 3477 3453 3441 3413 3366 3341 3299 3267 3245 
Schools that opened at start of 
year N/A 46 29 33 35 42 66 65 75 
Schools that closed at end of the 
year 70 41 61 82 67 108 97 97 N/A 
Closures that were middle or 
primary 43 16 47 59 24 50 33 6 N/A 
Grammar schools (% of pupils) 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 
Middle schools (%) 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 
CTC/Academies (non grammar) 
(%) 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.6 4.0 6.0 
Foundation (non grammar) (%) 22.6 22.3 22.6 22.8 23.2 23.2 23.4 23.1 22.9 
Voluntary-aided (non grammar) 
(%) 13.0 13.2 13.5 13.6 13.7 14.0 13.9 14.0 14.0 
Voluntary-con. (non grammar) 
(%) 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Note: the date 2002 refers to academic year 2001/2, and so on.  Spring Census data is used, except for 2010 
where only Autumn 2009 data was available at the time of analysis. 
Calculating school and neighbourhood composition 
Throughout the period of analysis we report changes in each school’s intake profile 
for the relevant year 7 cohort across four metrics: 
1. the proportion of the cohort who are known to be eligible for free school meals 
(FSM); 
2. the proportion of the cohort who are of White British ethnicity; 
3. the proportion of the cohort who scored in the top 25 per cent nationally in 
KS2 tests (top KS2); 
4. The proportion of the cohort who scored in the bottom 25 per cent nationally 
in KS2 tests (low KS2). 
We also generate measures of the social profile of children living close to a school to 
account for changes in residential composition over time.  Residential composition is 
calculated by measuring the characteristics of the school if all pupils in the 
neighbourhood wished to attend the school, with the school allocating places based 
on proximity to the school.  In computational terms, the number of pupils currently at 
the school is counted, then the same number of pupils who live closest to the school 
are found from all year 7 pupils currently in state schools.  The social and ability 
characteristics of these proximity pupils are measured. 
This approach to measuring the neighbourhood characteristics of a school produces 
indicators that reflect a set of pupils who live within a particular radius of the school.  
In practice, actual neighbourhoods that most schools draw from tend to be irregular 
rather than circular in shape, particularly where geographical barriers such as 
motorways, hills and lakes affect journey times. This means a school might draw 
from its direct neighbourhood, as it conceptualises it, yet may have an intake with 
characteristics significantly different from the neighbourhood measured by these 
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statistics. However, if the school's actual intake is irregular due either to the school 
themselves selecting a favourable catchment area, or due to parental choice, it is 
desirable to use the circular neighbourhood because it abstracts from these 
processes. For the purposes of this analysis, all that matters is that the statistic 
measures the average neighbourhood characteristics for any particular school type 
without bias, and there is no reason to suppose this should not be so (see also Allen, 
2007, for further discussion of the methods).  Of course, the choice of 
neighbourhood measurement is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but many have 
been tested and the substantive results reported are not sensitive to alternative 
measures of neighbourhood.  Alternative neighbourhood calculations include use of 
postcode areas (e.g. Chamberlain et al., 2006, Sutton Trust, 2006), a 3 kilometre 
walk-zone or the local authority.  However, we believe our measure achieves a more 
consistent treatment of urban and rural schools. 
Changes in the social composition of a school are described in four different ways in 
the analysis.  First, we describe the change that occurred between the period 
immediately preceding and succeeding the implementation of the 2003 Code, for 
example: 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- and 
post-2003 Code 
= 
Average school 
FSM proportion for 
years 2005 to 2008 
- 
Average school FSM 
proportion for years 
2002 to 2004 
Secondly, we describe the change that occurred between the period immediately 
preceding and succeeding the implementation of the 2007 Code, for example: 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- and 
post-2007 Code 
= 
Average school 
FSM proportion for 
years 2009 to 2010 
- 
Average school FSM 
proportion for years 
2005 to 2008 
Finally, we describe the change in the school’s social composition that is not 
accounted for by changing in the school’s neighbourhood characteristics, for 
example: 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- and 
post-2003 Code 
after accounting 
for residential 
sorting 
= 
Average school 
FSM proportion for 
years 2005 to 2008 
minus 
Average residential 
FSM proportion for 
years 2005 to 2008 
- 
Average school FSM 
proportion for years 
2002 to 2004 
minus 
Average residential 
FSM proportion for 
years 2002 to 2004 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- and 
post-2007 Code 
after accounting 
for residential 
sorting 
= 
Average school 
FSM proportion for 
years 2009 to 2010 
minus 
Average residential 
FSM proportion for 
years 2009 to 2010 
- 
Average school FSM 
proportion for years 
2005 to 2008 
minus 
Average residential 
FSM proportion for 
years 2005 to 2008 
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Analysis 
Changes in school composition 
We begin by summarising the overall changes in school composition in England from 
2002 to 2010 in order to set the background context for the policy changes of 
interest.  Indices of segregation are able to summarise overall changes in the 
distribution of pupils across schools into a single figure for each year.   
Figure 1 reports the index of dissimilarity, the most widely used segregation index, 
for our four binary indicators of school composition (FSM, white British ethnicity, top 
KS2 quartile, lowest KS2 quartile).1  Although the pattern of changes is not 
unambiguous, it does appear that school segregation across England has declined a 
little over the past decade.  The remainder of the analysis will explore the extent to 
which changes in the School Admissions Code could be responsible for this 
improvement in segregation. 
Figure 1: Secondary school segregation in England from 2002 to 2010 
 
Table 2 summarises changes in the distributions of school compositions for the 2884 
schools that were open in every year from 2002 to 2010.  The top half the table 
describes the change in compositions for the four years after the 2003 Code 
compared to the three years prior to the implementation of the 2003 Code.  The 
bottom half of the table shows the difference in school compositions for the two 
available years of data following the 2007 Code compared to the four years of data 
prior to the 2007 Code.  The (mean) average changes in composition are not 
particularly interesting since they simply reflect changes in the underlying social 
demographics of the cohort.  For example, the data shows that the White British 
ethnicity proportion in year 7 cohorts fell by 3.1 percentage points following the 
                                            
1
 The formula for the Index of Dissimilarity in an area with FSM free school meals pupils and NONFSM non FSM 
pupils and with j schools, each with fsmj pupils eligible for FSM and nonfsmj pupils not eligible for FSM is 
D
1
2
fsm j
FSM
nonfsmj
NONFSM
j
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implementation of the 2003 Code and 2.6 percentage points following the 
implementation of the 2007 Code, mirroring trends towards greater ethnicity diversity 
in the UK. 
The table highlights that the large majority of schools see relatively small changes in 
composition of cohorts across all the social metrics, but that a very small minority of 
schools have seen very large changes in social composition.  We specifically focus 
on these schools with very large changes in their intake composition in the final part 
of this report. 
Table 2: Distribution of changes in school composition resulting from Admission Codes 
    Percentile  
 
Mea
n 
S.D
. Min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Max 
Difference pre- and post- 2003 
Code:          
FSM proportion change (%) -0.1 3.7 -32.3 -4.0 -1.9 -0.2 1.4 3.6 24.1 
Ethnicity proportion change (%) -3.1 5.9 -48.7 -9.5 -5.1 -2.0 -0.5 0.7 47.8 
Top KS2 proportion change (%) -0.5 3.8 -19.5 -5.1 -2.8 -0.4 1.9 4.1 15.9 
Low KS2 proportion change (%) 0.5 3.9 -19.7 -4.2 -1.6 0.4 2.8 5.2 27.8 
Difference pre- and post- 2007 
Code:          
FSM proportion change (%) 0.9 4.1 -23.4 -3.2 -1.0 0.8 2.8 5.4 32.1 
Ethnicity proportion change (%) -2.6 6.6 -97.3 -8.1 -4.0 -1.5 0.1 1.4 46.2 
Top KS2 proportion change (%) -0.2 4.3 -23.7 -5.3 -2.9 -0.2 2.5 5.0 20.6 
Low KS2 proportion change (%) 0.4 4.4 -22.9 -5.0 -2.1 0.3 3.0 5.6 22.6 
  Note: N = 2884 (all schools that were open in every year from 2001/2 to 2009/10) 
Changes in school composition by governance type 
Table 3 shows the output from four regressions that model the change in school 
composition over the entire period.  In these regressions we report whether there are 
any differences in social composition changes by school governance type.  Our initial 
hypothesis is that voluntary-aided schools should be most affected by changes in the 
Admission Code; therefore they should see larger declines in the socio-demographic 
profile of their school. 
Overall, the regressions show relatively little relationship between school type and 
change in social composition of the school.  According to the analysis, grammar 
schools have seen a larger decline in their FSM proportion, a larger rise in their non-
white ethnicity proportion and an improvement in the KS2 scores of their intakes.  
Also, voluntary-aided schools have seen a somewhat larger fall in their FSM 
proportion than Community schools and have also become more ethnically mixed. 
14 
Table 3: Regression analysis of change in school composition between pre-2003 Code and 
post-2007 Code 
 
FSM proportion 
change 
Ethnicity 
proportion change 
Top KS2 
proportion change 
Low KS2 
proportion change 
Pre-2003 Code level 
of dependent variable -0.11 (0.01) *** 0.07 (0.01) *** -0.17 (0.01) *** -0.24 (0.01) *** 
Pre-2003 Code 
cohort size -0.01 (0.00) *** -0.01 (0.00) ** 0.00 (0.00) *** -0.01 (0.00) *** 
Change in cohort 
size -0.04 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.01)   0.03 (0.00) *** -0.05 (0.00) *** 
Grammar -2.45 (0.41) *** -5.24 (0.74) *** 12.04 (0.73) *** -7.05 (0.55) *** 
Middle -1.51 (0.34) *** 0.16 (0.62)  0.14 (0.36)  0.59 (0.39)  
CTC/Acad (non sel) -3.27 (3.21)  -0.47 (6.05)  -0.75 (3.47)  -3.75 (3.71)  
Foundation (non sel) 0.12 (0.22)  -0.71 (0.42) * 0.07 (0.24)  0.00 (0.26)  
Vol aided (non sel) -0.68 (0.26) *** -4.14 (0.48) *** -0.15 (0.29)  0.13 (0.31)  
Vol con (non sel) -0.80 (0.64)  -0.29 (1.21)  0.81 (0.69)  -0.33 (0.74)  
Constant 3.26 (0.38) *** -8.92 (0.83) *** 2.67 (0.38) *** 8.24 (0.54) *** 
N 2884   2884   2884   2884   
Adj R-squared 0.12   0.07   0.12   0.18   
Note: ***=1% stat. sig.; **=5% stat. sig.; *=10% stat. sig.. 
School and neighbourhood composition 
Where a school experiences a large change in its social composition it is possible 
this results from changes in the local residential population.  In this section we 
describe how much change in school composition over time still remains once we 
account for changes in residential composition close to the school.  We do this by 
first calculating the change in average school composition before and after each 
Admission Code implementation, then we subtract the change in the residential 
composition that has occurred in the area.  Table 4 shows the distribution of the 
percentage point change in school composition that remains after the percentage 
point change in residential composition is accounted for.  Comparison with the data 
in Table 4 suggests that most large changes in school composition are not 
accounted for by changing the demographics of the local neighbourhood. 
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Table 4: Distribution of changes in school composition not attributable to changes in 
residential composition 
   Percentile  
 Mean S.D. Min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Max 
Change pre- and post- 
2003 Code:          
FSM proportion (%) 0.3 3.4 -26.4 -3.2 -1.3 0.2 1.8 3.9 19.8 
Ethnicity proportion (%) -0.1 4.4 -26.1 -4.4 -1.5 0.0 1.4 3.6 42.4 
Top KS2 proportion (%) -0.4 3.6 -19.6 -4.7 -2.4 -0.4 1.6 3.7 22.1 
Low KS2 proportion (%) 0.4 3.6 -27.5 -3.7 -1.6 0.3 2.4 4.7 21.3 
Change pre- and post- 
2007 Code:          
FSM proportion (%) 0.2 3.6 -18.7 -3.6 -1.5 0.1 1.9 4.2 16.9 
Ethnicity proportion (%) 0.0 4.9 -68.4 -4.5 -1.6 0.1 1.7 4.2 32.0 
Top KS2 proportion (%) 0.0 4.0 -19.8 -4.5 -2.4 -0.1 2.2 4.6 19.0 
Low KS2 proportion (%) 0.3 4.0 -22.5 -4.3 -2.0 0.2 2.4 4.8 27.7 
Association between schools with inadmissible criteria and changes in school 
composition 
The most direct way to test the impact of a change in the Admissions Code is to 
analyse whether schools that used criteria that were soon to become inadmissible 
did indeed see a change in social profile of their year 7 intake following the Code’s 
implementation.  Table 5 reports the output from eight regressions that model the 
change in a school’s intake composition as a function of the 2002 intake 
composition, the change in residential sorting and a set of indicators of use of 
inadmissible criteria in 2001.  Because there are very small groups of schools using 
some of these inadmissible criteria, we also group them into a binary indicator of 
whether the school was using any of these ‘potentially selective’ (and now 
inadmissible) criteria. 
The regressions overall suggest that schools using criteria that were to become 
inadmissible did indeed experience a change in their intake composition following 
implementation of the 2003 Code.  Following the Code they experience a greater 
growth than other schools in the number of low KS2 pupils and minority ethnic pupils 
and saw a greater decline in the proportion of top KS2 pupils they admitted for entry.  
There is no evidence of a change in their FSM proportion, relative to other schools.  
All of these effect sizes are quite small: for example, the estimated impact of using 
potentially selective criteria on the change in low KS2 proportion is +0.56, meaning 
that these schools experienced an average increase of half a percentage point in 
their low KS2 proportion, compared to other schools.  Suppose a school using 
inadmissible criteria prior to the 2003 Code had an intake of 200 pupils had just 20 
low KS2 pupils, our estimates suggest that they would admit just one extra low KS2 
pupil (i.e. 21 overall) as a result of the implementation of the Code. 
We are unable to consistently measure what type of inadmissible criteria are 
associated with the largest changes in social composition.  This is likely to be 
because small numbers of schools were using some of these criteria, which explains 
the insignificant results.  However, most of the coefficients are correctly signed. 
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Table 5: Changes in school composition from 2003 Admission Code 
 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- 
and post- 2003 
Code 
Change in ethnicity 
proportion pre- and 
post- 2003 Code 
Change in top 
KS2 proportion 
pre- and post- 
2003 Code 
Change in low 
KS2 proportion 
pre- and post- 
2003 Code 
Pre-2003 Code level 
of dependent variable -0.02 (0.00) *** 
-
0.02 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Change in residential 
sorting 0.63 (0.02) *** 0.91 (0.02) *** 0.54 (0.02) *** 0.56 (0.02) *** 
School uses academic 
record (0.8%) -0.42 (0.71)  
-
0.65 (0.94)  2.98 (0.66) *** -0.36 (0.68)  
School uses 
connections (11.4%) 0.03 (0.20)  
-
0.70 (0.27) *** -0.21 (0.18)  0.29 (0.19)  
School interviews 
parents or pupils 
(3.0%) 0.44 (0.38)  
-
2.38 (0.51) *** -0.91 (0.35) *** 1.39 (0.36) *** 
Constant 0.51 (0.11) *** 1.19 (0.37) *** 0.47 (0.11) *** 1.26 (0.15) *** 
N 2618   2618   2618   2618   
Adj R-squared 0.26   0.46   0.30   0.32   
Pre-2003 Code level 
of dependent variable -0.02 (0.00) *** 
-
0.01 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Change in residential 
sorting 0.63 (0.02) *** 0.91 (0.02) *** 0.54 (0.02) *** 0.56 (0.02) *** 
School used 
potentially selective 
criteria (14.2%) 0.09 (0.19)  
-
1.20 (0.25) *** -0.24 (0.17)  0.59 (0.18) *** 
Constant 0.50 (0.11) *** 1.08 (0.37) *** 0.41 (0.11) *** 1.25 (0.15) *** 
N 2618   2618   2618   2618   
Adj R-squared 0.26   0.46   0.30   0.32   
Note: ***=1% stat. sig. 
Table 6 also reports eight regression outputs, but this time it uses information on 
schools that were using criteria in 2006 that were to become inadmissible in the 
2007 Code.  Once again, the overall results suggest that schools using these 
potentially selective criteria in 2006 did indeed experience a significant change in the 
ethnic and ability profile of their intake (but not the FSM profile).  Effect sizes are 
quite similar to those reported for the 2003 Code.  For example, the impact of using 
potentially selective criteria in 2006 on the change in top KS2 proportion is -0.56.  
This suggests that a school using these criteria with cohort size of 200, of which 40 
were top KS2 ability pupils would see a drop in the number of these pupils to 39 
pupils in the years following the implementation of the Code. 
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Table 6: Change in school composition following 2007 Admissions Code 
 
Change in FSM 
proportion pre- 
and post- 2007 
Code 
Change in ethnicity 
proportion pre- and 
post- 2007 Code 
Change in top KS2 
proportion pre- and 
post- 2007 Code 
Change in low KS2 
proportion pre- and 
post- 2007 Code 
Pre-2007 Code level 
of dependent 
variable 
-
0.03 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** 
Change in 
residential sorting 0.68 (0.02) *** 0.89 (0.02) *** 0.56 (0.02) *** 0.60 (0.02) *** 
Parental 
commitment needed 
(9.3%) 
-
0.10 (0.24)  -0.57 (0.32) * -0.53 (0.24) ** 0.58 (0.24) ** 
Priority to children of 
associated adults 
(3.8%) 
-
0.48 (0.36)  1.04 (0.48) ** 0.12 (0.36)  -0.16 (0.36)  
Interview required 
(0.3%) 
-
1.33 (1.18)  -3.30 (1.58) ** -1.52 (1.18)  -0.45 (1.18)  
Inadmissible 
supplementary info 
(7.2%) 
-
0.03 (0.27)  -2.01 (0.36) *** -0.46 (0.27) * 0.30 (0.27)  
Constant 0.94 (0.12) *** 0.21 (0.33)  -0.34 (0.13) *** 1.25 (0.17) *** 
N 2695   2695   2695   2695   
Adj R-squared 0.31   0.44   0.27   0.34   
Pre-2007 Code level 
of dependent 
variable 
-
0.03 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Change in 
residential sorting 0.68 (0.02) *** 0.89 (0.02) *** 0.56 (0.02) *** 0.60 (0.02) *** 
School uses 
potentially selective 
criteria (17.6%) 
-
0.19 (0.18)  -1.06 (0.24) *** -0.56 (0.18) *** 0.44 (0.18) ** 
Constant 0.93 (0.12) *** 0.11 (0.33)  -0.33 (0.13) *** 1.21 (0.17) *** 
N 2695   2695   2695   2695   
Adj R-squared 0.31   0.44   0.27   0.34   
Note: ***=1% stat. sig.; **=5% stat. sig.; *=10% stat. sig.. 
Schools with large changes in social composition 
In the final part of this report we select a small group of schools for whom we can 
identify large changes in social composition in order to illustrate how changes to 
admissions arrangements have been implemented in practice.  This is not a random 
sample; on the contrary we have chosen these schools with very substantial 
changes in intakes to highlight the wide variety of circumstances that can lead to 
changes in school composition.  To describe changes at these schools, we have 
drawn on information from admissions brochures, the School Adjudicator reports, 
Ofsted reports and National Pupil Database.  Thus our discussion of admissions 
criteria and practices is presented along with other changes that can be ascertained 
from the data available. 
Schools becoming less advantaged for the period 
We focus in the first instance on schools whose social composition had become 
much less advantaged over the period in question.  The first three schools we 
describe here illustrate situations where we believe that the 2003 and 2007 
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Admissions Codes were critically important to the changes in social composition 
because they altered both the published criteria and manner in which the criteria 
were applied. 
School A is a single sex voluntary-aided school that, in 2001, used parental and 
pupil interviews to select pupils.  It also used banding that was not ‘fair’ but selective 
in that it selected more higher ability than lower ability pupils (27% from the top 25% 
of the ability range, 55% from the middle 50% and 18% from the lowest 25%). 
The school’s resulting intake in 2002 was significantly more affluent and more able 
than either the national average or the immediate locality.  For example, free school 
meals eligibility amongst the 2002 year 7 cohort was just 2 percent, versus 46 
percent in the immediate neighbourhood.  Similarly, despite the use of banding, over 
two-thirds of the intake scored in the top quartile in their KS2 tests at the end of 
primary school and just 8 percent scored in the lowest quartile.   
The school had also been subject to objections to the Office of the Schools 
Adjudicator in the period under investigation.  The objection, in 2007, covered 
different aspects of the admission arrangements including for example catchment 
areas, siblings and children in care.  The objection was upheld.  The determination 
also required the school to check its supplementary form to ensure that it was in line 
with the School Admissions Code.  It is also significant that the banding in place in 
2008 was not in theory socially selective as it involved selecting 25% from the top 
25% of the ability range, 50% from the middle 50% and 25% from the lowest 25%. 
The result of these changes in the school’s admissions procedures is that by 2010, 
20 percent of their year 7 cohort is eligible for free school meals, a figure that is still 
lower than their local neighbourhood but is higher than the national average.  The 
ability profile of the intake is still relatively advantaged, but is now a little more 
balanced with just under half the pupils scoring in the top quartile on KS2 and 14 
percent scoring in lowest quartile. 
School B, a voluntary-aided school, was so advantaged in its intake in 2002 that it 
looked almost identical to a grammar school rather than a comprehensive.  Three-
quarters of its pupils scored in the top quartile on KS2 tests and no pupils in its year 
7 intake scored in the lowest quartile.  It appeared to have achieved this advantaged 
intake by interviewing pupils and giving priority to children of former pupils.   
In 2008 the school was subject to an objection to the Office of the Schools 
Adjudicator which determined that one of its criteria giving priority to the children and 
grandchildren of a charitable foundation be removed.  An objection to a newly 
introduced criterion, giving priority to 10% of pupils with aptitude in sport was not 
upheld.   
In 2010 it remains one of the most advantaged ‘comprehensive’ schools in the 
country with just 3 percent of pupils eligible for free school meals.  However, the 
ability profile of the intake is marginally more mixed, with half the pupils scoring in 
the top quartile in KS2 tests and 4 percent scoring in the lowest quartile. 
School C is a foundation school that gave priority to children of former pupils and 
employees in 2001.  Its intake had a higher average ability than the local 
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neighbourhood and just 5 percent of the pupils were eligible for free school meals in 
2002.  An objection was made to the Office of the Schools Adjudicator in 2005 as a 
result of which the criterion giving priority to children of former pupils was removed.   
By 2010 the ability profile of its intake is much closer to the national average.  Just 7 
percent of pupils are eligible for free school meals, which is below the national 
average but is roughly representative of the local neighbourhood. 
We believe that the experiences of the following two schools in one urban authority 
illustrate how the Admissions Code and changes in the local schooling market can 
combine to produce very large changes in the social composition at schools. 
School D is a Roman Catholic voluntary-aided school that interviewed parents and 
pupils and also used banding in 2001.  The intake profile of the school was well 
above the national average and above that at every other local school, despite being 
located in one of the most deprived parts of London.  In 2008, the school no longer 
interviewed parents and pupils and no longer used banding. 
Interestingly, the school appears to have been impacted by the opening of 
Academies in the local authority, as shown in Figure 2.  Although it is not possible to 
establish causality here, it would appear that the deterioration in the affluence of this 
school’s intake mirrors the opening of four new Academy schools in 2004/5 onwards.  
The result is that by 2010 this school has an intake profile that is less able than the 
typical school in the local authority and is also almost exclusively non-white British 
ethnicity. 
School E is a CofE voluntary-aided school that in 2001 interviewed parents and 
pupils and also used banding.  The intake profile in 2002 was typical of the local 
authority, making this a relatively deprived school by national standards.   
In 2008, the school no longer used interviews or banding.  This school also appears 
to have been affected by the opening of Academies in the local authority, although 
its cohort size has not particularly declined.  It now has a very disadvantaged ability 
profile of intake, with just 3 percent of pupils scoring in the top quartile in KS2 tests 
and almost two-thirds of pupils scoring in the lowest quartile in KS2 tests (see Figure 
2).  This makes it the most deprived school in a very deprived local authority.  
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Figure 2: Changes in the proportion of top ability KS2 pupils in year 7 cohorts across LA 
 
Key: Grey dashed lines show intakes at Community schools; black dotted lines show intakes at Academies; red 
thin lines show intakes at voluntary-aided schools and thick red lines show intakes at voluntary-aided schools 
that are discussed above. 
There are other schools that have experienced large declines in their intake that we 
believe are largely unrelated to changes in their admissions criteria over the period. 
School F is a voluntary-aided Roman Catholic school that has experienced a very 
large decline in both the size and affluence of its cohort over the period of analysis.  
The cohort size has shrunk from 124 in 2002 to 46 in 2010.  The proportion of pupils 
in the top KS2 quartile has declined from 19 percent to just 7 percent by 2010.   
In 2001, the school interviewed parents and pupils; by 2008, both practices had 
discontinued.  The school has been subject to discussion regarding reorganisation of 
Catholic schooling at least since 2007 (as mentioned in the Ofsted report of that 
year).  This reorganisation may have been accelerated by a decline in demand for 
Catholic schooling due to demographic change in the area.  However, the 
consequence of the discussions has been that parents have been reluctant to admit 
their children to the school, making the proposed closure in 2011 inevitable. 
School G is a voluntary-aided school that has also experienced a very large decline 
in both the size and affluence of its cohort over the period of analysis.  The cohort 
size has shrunk from 200 in 2002 to 75 in 2010.  The proportion of pupils in the top 
KS2 quartile shrunk from 16 percent to as low as 7 percent in 2009, although there is 
evidence it may now be recovering.  The school was subject to admissions changes 
as a result of the change in the Code with the interviewing of parents and pupils 
being discontinued between 2001 and 2008.  However, the schools demographic 
profile appeared to be stable until it failed an Ofsted inspection in 2004 and again in 
2006.  Although it did pass its 2007 Ofsted inspection, it appears that the 
demographic profile of the school has not yet recovered. 
Schools becoming more advantaged for the period 
In addition we identified schools whose social composition had become more 
advantaged.  In this case, we would not expect to see schools that had been using 
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admission criteria or practices that were later deemed inadmissible. Rather we might 
expect to see schools with admissions criteria that had been introduced with a view 
to obtaining a larger pool from which to select pupils via means deemed admissible.  
We thus focused on schools that were selecting a proportion of pupils on the basis of 
aptitude (or ability given the difficulties distinguishing between these concepts), or 
schools that used banding or random allocation. 
School H was a community school in 2001, selecting a proportion of pupils on the 
basis of ability in music and sport.  In 2008, it was a foundation school, responsible 
for its own admissions.  It selected a proportion of pupils on the basis of aptitude in 
music and sport and also used both banding and random allocation.  The school’s 
last Ofsted report in 2010 was outstanding (it had been put in special measures in 
1998).   
This school now has an above average ability intake with 33 percent of pupils 
scoring in the top quartile nationally in 2010 compared to 6 percent in 2002.  The 
FSM profile has also radically changed: it was one of the most deprived schools in 
the country in 2002 with 75% FSM and now has just 25% FSM.  Whilst the local 
neighbourhood demographics have changed little, the school has gone from being 
more deprived than its immediate locale to being more affluent. 
School I, a community school, selected a proportion of pupils in the basis of aptitude 
in technology in 2001 but in 2008 this was no longer in use (as its use was prohibited 
by Regulation).  The school’s Ofsted report was good in 2003 and outstanding in 
2007. 
This school had a very deprived intake in 2002 with 43 percent of pupils eligible for 
FSM and half the pupils scoring in the bottom quartile in KS2 tests.  However, 
although there has been little change in the schools FSM proportion from around 40 
percent throughout the period, the ability profile of the intake is now significantly 
improved, though still below the national average.  In 2010, 28 percent of pupils 
scored in the lowest quartile in KS2. 
School J, a foundation school, was subject to an objection to the Office of the 
Schools Adjudicator about its admissions arrangements in 2004.  The key elements 
of the objection were the failure of the school to give priority to looked after children, 
failure to give priority to siblings and no reference being given to children with 
statements of special educational need.  The objections were upheld.  A further 
objection in 2006 (relating to first preference first) was not upheld.  In 2008, this 
school used banding, but it was not used in 2001.  The school was graded by Ofsted 
as being ‘good’ in 2007. 
This school now has almost no white British pupils in it, reflecting the demographic 
changes in the immediate neighbourhood to the school.  However, the increasing 
polarisation of this school’s intake is not mirrored across the city as a whole, where 
secondary schools are actually becoming marginally more integrated (albeit from 
very high levels of segregation).  The index of dissimilarity of white British ethnicity 
pupils has fallen from 0.67 in 2002 to 0.59 in 2010. 
This is a school that had an ability profile in intake significantly below the national 
average with just 6 percent of its pupils scoring in the top quartile nationally and 62 
22 
percent of the pupils scoring in the lowest quartile.  This was actually largely 
representative of the immediate neighbourhood.  The ability profile of the school has 
improved so that in 2010 14 percent of pupils scored in the top quartile nationally 
and 38 percent in the lowest quartile.  This is still well below the national average, 
but still largely reflects the local community.  This data appear to show how a school 
can experience large changes in its profile if the local area changes. 
Discussion 
This research has shown that the 2003 and 2007 School Admissions Codes appear 
to have been at least in part responsible for changes in social composition of pupils 
at schools with criteria and arrangements that were subsequently deemed 
inadmissible.  Although the average impact is relatively small, the direction of the 
impact is consistent with the observation that school segregation across England in 
terms of all the social metrics has declined a little at the same time that regulations 
were tightening.  The fact that these changes in school composition occurred over 
the same period that saw increasingly tight regulation did not mean that we could 
automatically attribute them to the introduction and progressive strengthening of the 
Codes. But, once we had controlled for changes in neighbourhood composition the 
association held. 
It was a reasonable expectation that no association would be found between the 
increasing regulation and the intake of schools given that many factors affect the 
composition of a school’s population other than their admission arrangements. 
Factors include those parts of the codes to do with subsidised travel and choice 
advice.  Equally important may be changes in the organisation of schools in an area 
including mergers and closures. Not least will be changes in the local perception of 
schools which may be precipitated by Ofsted assessments, or high profile incidents, 
or changing relations between staff and parents. In addition, if schools have a strong 
incentive to manipulate their intakes, their response to regulations that outlaw 
previous suspect arrangements may be to seek other ways such as making the most 
of currently legal means.  For example, although religious schools are no longer able 
to interview parents to determine religious adherence, they could use information 
contained in Supplementary Information Forms to modify their intake if they so wish. 
Contrary to expectations, school type was not strongly associated with change in 
composition. Given that previous studies have shown that the admission 
arrangements of voluntary-aided schools offered more potential for covert selection 
than other types of schools and that these were progressively ruled out by regulation 
we had hypothesised that their intakes would have changed more than other types 
of school but this was not the case except in terms of ethnicity where they have 
become more ethnically diverse.  However, amongst the schools identified with more 
extreme changes a significant number were foundation or voluntary-aided and so 
responsible for their own admissions. 
What implications, if any, do these findings have for admissions policy? First, it 
emphasises that, if the differentiation of school intakes is a concern, then regulating 
admission arrangements does appear to have an impact but that how a school 
admits its pupils is only one of the factors determining the composition of a school's 
population. Relative to all contributing factors some admission arrangements can 
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have a very small impact and others a very large impact. Policy and regulation 
designed to outlaw covert selection or procedural unfairness – for example, 
prohibiting interviews and oversubscription criteria that by default may socially select 
will have a relatively small effect. Those designed to balance intakes on one metric 
or another - for example banding across an area to achieve equal proportions of 
pupils from the whole attainment range, or selection by attainment as in grammar 
schools, or selection by lottery to randomise from all applications are likely to have a 
very large impact. 
These issues become particularly relevant as there are likely to be more schools – in 
particular, academies and free schools – that have autonomy over admissions.  
Previous studies (West et al., 2004; West et al., 2011) have shown that schools that 
are their own admission authority are more likely to have admissions criteria that 
enable schools to be unfairly selective in their intakes and there is therefore a case 
for moving admission powers away from individual schools and putting them into the 
hands of an independent body that administers admissions across an area and 
ideally sets admissions criteria that are consistent across all schools.  Moreover, if 
admissions were administered by an independent body, it would increase the 
transparency of the admissions process and ensure that decisions are not made 
behind closed doors with no external scrutiny. 
Further tightening of the Admissions Code would also be desirable given that there is 
still much room for discretion in the kind of information required in supplementary 
information forms (SIFs). It would be helpful if what is and is not acceptable were 
made more explicit; indeed the Office of the Schools Adjudicator has proposed that 
the Department for Education with faith bodies draw up model Supplementary 
Information Forms (SIFs) (Office of the Schools Adjudicator, 2009). 
Looking to the future the effect of new schools within an area will depend on the 
kinds of admission arrangements they adopt. Regulation to avoid unfair practices 
and, more radically, balanced intakes will be crucial. Area wide banding and random 
allocation offer powerful tools to achieve a maximally functioning education market 
and to focus competition and popularity on the quality of provision rather than the 
social characteristics of the intake. 
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Endnotes 
                                            
i
 See School Admissions Code 2007 (DfES, 2007) para 1.72; para 1.101; para 1.102. 
ii
 Only 0.8% of the families with children transferring to secondary school in the 15 case study LAs had any 
contact with a Choice Adviser and only about half (0.4%) were in a target group. But even the 0.4% of targeted 
parents were not all helped to gain access to high performing popular schools. Of those parents from socially 
disadvantaged backgrounds who wanted such access, some did not fit the over subscription criteria and the 
role of the Choice Adviser was to reassure them about the less popular schools for which they qualified. 
iii
 If a school is undersubscribed then all applications must be offered a place, unless the child does not meet 
minimum academic standards set for entry to a grammar school (see DfES, 2007). 
iv
 In a minority of cases criteria for September 2002 were used. 
v
 In England in January 2008 according to the then DCSF figures there were 3140 secondary schools (excluding 
middle deemed secondary); our figure was 3134 the difference being due to school closures.  Our sample of 
academies was higher than in January 2008 (94 compared with 83) and the number of city technology colleges 
lower (3 compared with 5).  Schools were classified according to their status on 1 September 2008 (see West 
et al., 2009). 
vi
 In 2008/09 there were 2,879,560 pupils in maintained secondary schools 
(http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000918/index.shtml.  Excel sheet 1: Table 1.1.) and of these 
24,900 were in care (Harker 2009) 
(http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snsg-04470.pdf). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
                                                                                                                                       
Ref: DFE-RR038 
ISBN: 978-1-84775-800-2 
© Department for Education 
September 2010 
 
